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Abstract
The original Homo Economicus has progressed from an atomistic and self-interested individual to a
socially embedded agent in modern economics. In particular, social interaction models suggest that the
individual’s own utility of undertaking an action may be inﬂuenced by the number of peers taking this
same action. Hence, people gain by conforming to, or di erentiating their behaviour from that of others.
A number of papers have also suggested why people want to conform. In particular, Akerlof and Kranton
(2000, 2002, 2005) suggest that people belong to certain groups and wish to adopt the corresponding
social identity by behaving according to the behavioural prescriptions of these groups. In this paper, we
present a social interaction model that is based on a di erent account of identity. The concept of identity
used here is on a more personal level and suggests that people have desired self-images of themselves
that they wish to attain at some time in the future. Hence, individuals aim to transform their current
individual characteristics into those of their self-image. They try to achieve this by joining social groups
and adopting the typical characteristics of these groups. However, groups will be modiﬁed over time by
the people joining them. This may induce individuals to revise their previous choices and eventually to
move on and to choose di erent groups. The model thus presents an endogeneous interaction structure
and o ers an account of endogenous group formation as well as an endogenous evolution of personal
identity. We further study in what sense and under what conditions the dynamics at the individual and
at the social level will reach an “equilibrium” and what the nature of such an equilibrium is.
Keywords: Economic agent, social interaction, conformity,
personal identity, self-image, change
JEL Classiﬁcation: D01, D63, Z13
1Alan Kirman would like to thank IAS Princeton for its hospitaltiy and the ACI “Complexit´ e” for ﬁnancial aid.
We would also like to thank Kaushik Basu, Roland Benabou, St´ ephane Luchini, Eric Maskin, and the members of
the Princeton-IAS Economics and Psychology seminar and the Cornell economics seminar for their comments.“A man is said to be the same person from childhood until he is
advanced in years: yet though he is called the same he does not at
any time possess the same properties; he is continually becoming a
new person not only in his body but in his soul besides we ﬁnd none of
his manners or habits, his opinions, desires, pleasures, pains or fears,
ever abiding the same in his particular self, some things grow in him
while others perish.”
Plato, Symposium 207D-208B
“To assume individuals as ﬁxed or developing independently of eco-
nomic activity means merely that we do not evaluate, in a normative
analysis of economic activity, the way they got to be the way they
are - and the way they change.”
Herbert Gintis (1974, p. 415)
“...everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of
the human freedoms – to choose one’s attitude in any given set of
circumstances, to choose one’s own way.”
Victor Frankl (1963, p. 104)
1 Introduction
In certain areas of economic theory, the standard concept of the economic agent as an independent,
atomistic individual who, endowed with his preferences and budget constraints, considers prices
as the sole source of information for his optimal choices, has over the last decades started to be
replaced with the concept of a socially embedded individual (Manski 2000). This is an individual,
who gains or loses in utility if he behaves as others do or adheres to social norms and rules,
independently of his own private self-concerned preferences. Even more generally, the socially
embedded individual gains or loses in utility with the number of peers undertaking the same
action as he does. Taking account of particular “social preferences” of individuals as well as of
the inﬂuences of other people’s choices on individuals’ own decisions o ered economists a way of
accounting for a number of social phenomena that have a direct impact on individual welfare, but
also on a number of economic variables such as productivity and consumption. Economists have
been able to explain for example, how educational investment and residential choice can lead to
segregation into high-skilled and low-skilled residential areas (B´ enabou 1993, 1996; Durlauf 1996),
how social interaction can lead to di erent crime levels across time and space (Glaeser, Sacerdote,
Scheinkman 1996), how social capital, deﬁned, for example, as the average of a particular good
chosen within a given group of people a ects individual choice behaviour such as divorce (Becker
and Murphy 2000) or even how the adherence to particular social norms can lead to the formation
of “underclasses” (Oxoby 2004). “Non-market interactions” (Glaeser and Scheinkman 2001) have
2thus become an increasingly important area of research and study for economists.
A common characteristic of these models is that they depict situations based on the rather
psychological assumption that “birds of a feather ﬂock together”, that is, people desire to conform
to others or to given social standards of their particular neighbourhood or even that people choose
to interact with those that are closest to them in terms of social distance (Akerlof 1997). The
general idea therefore is that like is attracted to like and thus people may conform to the behaviour
of others in order to be like them. In most economic models, this either presupposes a given
interaction structure or a given set of groups and agents can choose where to situate themselves
in the structure or to which groups they want to belong. One interesting result that these models
often produce is that the gain in conformity can outweigh the satisfaction of (heterogeneous)
individual preferences (Bernheim 1994) and it is this fact that can lead to particularly curious
situations where individuals end up with a lower welfare than they would, if for example, they
were to consider their own individual private preferences alone.2
More recently, Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005) have gone beyond social interaction or
preferences for particular social goods and norms and have introduced the concept of “identity”,
in particular a person’s social identity, into a standard model of behaviour. They have gone further
since their concept of identity, provides a particular reason as to why people want to conform to
others. The general idea is that individuals desire to be and to act in conformity with their social
identity and that acting against it would cause a loss in identity, that is, anxiety or discomfort
– either in themselves or in others – and this loss can trigger certain actions with the aim to
restore the “sense of self” (2000, p. 715). They deﬁne identity as the social categories to which an
individual belongs. These categories are linked with particular socially determined “self-images”
that consist of speciﬁc characteristics as well as behavioural rules and prescriptions the individual
should comply with if she participates in those categories. Akerlof and Kranton’s models then
show that individuals have an incentive to choose particular e ort levels or actions such that their
own individual characteristics ﬁt with the socially determined “self-image” of the social categories
to which they belong (or want to belong).
Akerlof and Kranton’s models thus explain conformity through identity. However, one can
again imagine situations where the “conformity e ect” outweighs the satisfaction of individual
preferences, that is, where actions that are carried out in accordance with one’s social identity
receive more weight than actions based on one’s own individual preferences.3 While these models
2That is to say that the social utility component of agents’ preferences and their private incentives can “clash”
(Durlauf 2002, p. 69) and individuals would be better o  if an equilibrium prevails where private and social incentives
go in the same direction (i.e. have the same sign). Similar issues are also discussed for example in Gordon et al.
(2007, p.3) and Blume and Durlauf (2004).
3In Akerlof and Kranton (2002), they propose a utility function which is a convex combination of private
individual preferences and social identity preferences with an exogenously given distribution of weights in favour
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certain circumstances in which actions are carried out in accordance to one’s social identity, but
they create some form of discomfort because one’s own individual preferences have not been
su ciently satisﬁed. This is to say that there may be situations in which an individual feels under
a social obligation or pressure to conform to his social identity, even though he would have liked
to behave according to his own individual preferences. In such a case, one may assume that an
agent may also want to leave the group and change his social identity in order to be able to choose
more freely what he prefers doing.
Our paper will develop such an idea. It is situated in the context of identity and also of social
interaction, in particular following the social interaction literature of e.g. Brock and Durlauf (2001,
2002), Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001) and Horst and Scheinkman (2006). It distinguishes itself
from previous papers in two speciﬁc ways. First, we introduce the concept of personal identity.
This is di erent from Akerlof and Kranton’s concept of identity since it is not based on group
memberships and similarities to others, but rather on the particular personal identity of a speciﬁc
individual and the evolution of her characteristics over time (Horst et al. 2006; Kirman and Teschl
2004, 2006; Teschl 2007). We will assume that instead of acting in conformity to given social
standards and thus of choosing to transform individual characteristics to bring them as close
as possible to the characteristics of the “social” self-image, individuals have their own “private”
self-image which they desire to attain by choosing to belong to particular social groups that help
them achieving those desired characteristics. If a particular group does not help to achieve the
person’s self-image, this may cause a feeling of discrepancy between who the person currently is
and who she wants to be, and to alleviate this feeling, the individual may want to change her
group participation. Groups are therefore only a means to “realise oneself” and not purely an aim
in themselves. In our model, an individual at time t will have particular (stochastic) preferences
over her own characteristics, her self-image and her group-memberships (both described by a
vector of characteristics), and the direction in which they will evolve in t + 1. Personal identity
is then the individualised process that explains the combination and interaction of these three
aspects of a person over time.
The second aspect that we analyse in this paper concerns social interaction. People with
di erent characteristics will join di erent groups (or types as we will call them) – but this will
modify the characteristics of those groups over time. This change in group characteristics may
push individuals to reconsider their previous choice of group and eventually to move on to choose
a di erent group that helps them better to achieve their desired self-image. Hence, in contrast to
of social identity preferences. To justify this, Akerlof and Kranton state that “ethnographies suggest such a low
value [for individual preferences]” (2002, p. 1175). If this were true in general, this would not be good news for the
standard concept of the economic agent who usually simply maximises his own individual preferences.
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structure is endogenised. This means that we present an account of endogenous personal identity
formation and an endogenous formation of social groups.
The next step is to see what we can say about the “society” that consists of people who care
about their personal identity. That is, what social interaction models help to understand is the
behavior of a population of actors (or of a “society”) rather than that of a single actor. Hence,
the general question that interests us in this paper is under what conditions the interactive sto-
chastic network that consists of individuals whose personal identity evolves over time will be in
equilibrium. An equilibrium will consist of a given number of social groups whose characteristics
will no longer change, and with individuals who move between groups but where the distribution
of individuals over groups does not change. Thus our equilibrium notion is not a static one in
the sense that agents no longer move, but conveys the idea that the social groups stabilise and
that the proportions of individuals belonging to each group remain constant. Under standard
continuity conditions on the agents’ behavior we prove the existence of such an aggregate equili-
brium. In personal identity terms, this means that when personal identity is weak, that is, when
individuals do not put “too much weight” on current states when revising their choices, and when
preferences depend continuously on types, the aggregate equilibrium turns out to be unique and
asymptotically stable. This means that the distribution of characteristics, self-images and groups
settles down to a unique limit in the long run.
This paper is a theoretical contribution to the existing social interaction literature, a contri-
bution however, that promotes a new behavioural foundation for individuals, which is consistent
with psychological (and philosophical) research as we will explain in the following section. In the
next section, we will present our concept of personal identity in more detai.l In Section 3 we
develop the model. We discuss the results and conclude in Section 4.
2 The Psychology and Philosophy of Personal Identity
Identity has been introduced by Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005) as an extra element
into a standard utility function. More speciﬁcally, it has been introduced in terms of an identity
function, which depends on a person’s own actions as well as on those of others, on her assigned
social categories, and on how well her own given personal characteristics as well as actions match
those of the assigned categories, which are represented by a given number of prescriptions. In
their ﬁrst paper (2000), they present a prototype model with two di erent social categories (green
and red) both associated with a particular action. They assume, following an extensive review of
socio-psychological literature, that each person has a number of internalised rules of behaviour
and to act against them would cause anxiety. This may be the reason why a person belonging to
5the green category for example refrains from taking an action associated with the red category.
However, even if the person’s personal satisfaction from taking this action more than outweighs
the psychological discomfort that carrying it out generates, she may cause anxiety in others, i.e.
in both, the members of her own category as well as those of the other category. This anxiety
constitutes a “loss in identity”, which entails a drop in utility. To o set this loss, others may
respond with actions, even if costly, that restores their damaged sense of identity. This in its
turn will represent a loss to the person who violated the category prescriptions. Whether the
person will or will not engage in this action is, in the end, the result of an arbitrage between the
resultant advantages and disadvantages. A model of this type has been elaborated in more detail,
for example in the context of education and schooling in Akerlof and Kranton (2002), where they
explain the separation of pupils, who choose an e ort level as well as a group membership, where
the groups are the leading crowd, the nerds¨ and the ”burnouts”. It turns out that pupils are better
o  the closer their own characteristics and behaviour are to the ideal self-image of the category
to which they have chosen to belong.
These models thus depict identity as a form of social identiﬁcation, where group membership
and conformity with the group is decisive for a person’s self-understanding. In addition to this,
identity is psychologically regulated through internalised rules of the particular category or group
to which the person belongs and the anxiety produced by violating them. Finally, these models also
represent the idea that people have a universal need for belonging, which psychologists consider
to be intrinsic to human nature (Baumeister and Leary 1995).
There are also a number of studies showing that self-understanding, and, linked to that, the
relation between the “self” and others, is indeed inﬂuenced by the social background and culture
a person lives in. However, cultures vary and hence di erent aspects of the “self” are made more
salient in di ering social contexts or are associated with di erent psychological processes such as
cognition, emotion and motivation. For example, a (rather simplistic) distinction has been made
between cultures focussing on an independent conception of the self (associated in particular
with North-America) as opposed to those that promote an interdependent conception of the self
(associated with East-Asian countries) (Markus and Kitayama 1991, Iyengar and Brockner 2001,
Cross and Gore 2003). The essential aspect of the former view is the idea of the “self” as an
autonomous, independent person, who is responsive to the social environment, but this social
responsiveness is often only a means to express or assert the internal attributes of the “self”
(Markus and Kitayama 1991, p. 226). For the independent self, to enter into, but also to leave
social engagements freely is important and the person vigilantly protects his or her individualism
and limits the inﬂuence of others (Cross and Gore 2003, p. 538). Indeed, while it is important
for the “self” to be part of a larger collective unit, it is equally important for the person to be
di erent and distinct from others. Hence, a thesis which has been advanced is that distinctiveness
6is a factor that underlies the selection of social groups in order to achieve a balance between
similarity to others and uniqueness and individuality. In other words, a person aims to attain
an “optimal distinctiveness” to secure a balanced self-concept in which individual characteristics
coexist with being a member of particular social groups (Brewer 1991, 2003). If this optimal
identity is threatened or challenged in any way, the individual will attempt to restore congruence
or consistency between the self-concept and the group membership, either by adjusting the self-
concept to ﬁt better with the prototype of the social group to which the person belongs, or by
choosing a group that is more congruent with the “self” (Brewer 2003, p. 484).
The latter idea is also reﬂected in psychological “self-discrepancy theory” (Higgins 1987).
This theory suggests that a person possesses di erent domains of the self, namely the actual self,
the ideal self and the ought self. These domains represent respectively the attributes someone
possesses, would like to possess or should possess. They can be seen and evaluated from the
standpoint of the person herself or from that of another person. Inconsistencies or discrepancies
between these self-concepts, for instance between the actual self of the person and her ideal self,
or between the actual self of the person and the ideal self such as another person ideally wants the
person in question to be, will cause di erent amounts of emotional discomfort and uneasiness. The
person will thus attempt to reduce these distances by changing the standpoint of evaluation, the
domain of the self or will undertake some actions with the aim of restoring consistency between
these selves.
The idea developed above is also that di erent self-conceptions (or self-images) serve as regu-
latory references with respect to which one tries to reduce certain distances or discrepancies by
moving the current state as close to a desired end state as possible (Carver and Scheier 1990) or
by distancing the current state as far as possible from an undesired state or self-image (Higgins
et al. 1999). This implies that people have a rather extensive knowledge of themselves and their
desires and that they have both the possibility and the intention to change over time (Cantor et
al. 1986). It is assumed that people work on certain life-tasks based on the knowledge of their
preferences, abilities, acknowledgement of social roles and other personal characteristics. These
life-tasks, however, change over time as do their goals and achievements. By pursuing these di e-
rent life-tasks, people develop di erent images of themselves in the future. That is, they are guided
by the imagination of their own future possible selves, which are cognitive representations giving
a personalised vision of their overall motives. These possible selves thus involve the potential for
change of a person and represents who they could be and would like to be (Cantor et al. 1986).
In contrast, a person with an interdependent conception of the self has the tendency to see
his or herself as part of a larger social relationship and is therefore more connected and less
di erentiated from others. Behaviour is contingent on, if not determined by what the person
perceives to be the thoughts, feelings or actions of others. A person’s basic motivation is to ﬁt
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statuses, roles, and positions and their related obligations and commitments constitute their
self-understanding rather than their own individual characteristics, attributes or guiding self-
concepts. Indeed, it has even been suggested that those with an interdependent self-conception
are less subject to the need to maintain consistency or congruence as mentioned above, which
is felt for example when social demands are opposed by individual desires or attitudes (Markus
and Kitayama 1991, p. 240). This is because the interdependent conception of the self gives less
weight to individual elements and characteristics, which means that in those circumstances, private
feelings are generally regulated to ﬁt with the requirement of a given situation. This suggestion
is also in line with the idea that for the interdependent concept of the self, social information
has more weight, whereas for the independent conception of the self, it is personal information
(Iyengar and Brockner 2001). By social information is meant a person’s knowledge of what others
have said, chosen or done, whereas private information is a person’s knowledge of what he or she
has done or chosen in the past. Given that the goal of a person with an interdependent concept of
self is to strive for interconnectedness and integration, what will be important is not how she or he
behaved in the past, but how others behaved. A person with an independent conception however,
tends to want to be consistent with his or her choices in the past and will try to maintain a
coherent self-concept over time. In contrast, the interdependent self has a more malleable identity
concept in that respect and will not feel so strongly this need for personal and intertemporal
consistency (Iyengar and Brockner 2001, p. 18)
All this suggests that in human psychology, more is going on than expressing a preference to
conform and to behave like others. It also suggests that identity is not related to social identiﬁca-
tion alone. Indeed, being member of particular groups and thus being associated with a speciﬁc
social identity does not preclude one’s choosing how much importance to attribute to the di erent
aspects of those given groups (Sen 1999, 2006). And this attributed importance will depend on
the varying degrees of interaction between a person’s personal history and current characteristics,
desired self-conceptions or self-images and the choice of groups, which together will contribute to
a person’s personal identity.
But what exactly then is personal identity? Philosophers have reﬂected on this question for
centuries. It has attracted particular interest since two competing views of identity have emerged,
namely numerical identity (being always one and the same over time) and qualitative identity
(being qualitatively exactly the same as something else) (Ferret 1998). For a long time, philoso-
phers maintained that qualitative identity is a precondition for numerical identity. Only because
there is some criterion or some aspect of the person that remains qualitatively the same over time
is it possible to say that we are dealing with one and the same, i.e. identical, person over time.
But what is this criterion? It cannot be a person’s body, because a body changes over time. It
8cannot be a person’s memories either, because a person accumulates new memories and forgets
others. It could be a person’s DNA. But if by personal identity one understands more than a
criterion that establishes the sameness and uniqueness of a person over time, but something that
also incorporates information about who the person actually is, then DNA is not a satisfacto-
ry criterion. Hence, the requirement of qualitative identity is too restrictive in order to deﬁne
personal identity. People do change throughout the course of their life and identity cannot be
considered in any strict sense to be either “all or nothing”, but it is rather a matter of degrees.
Indeed, as Derek Parﬁt (1986) suggests, the question is less what identity is, but what matters for
identity, that is, how much change can be admitted in order to still be able to say that person X
at time t1 and person Y at time t2 are indeed the same person. This means that from one moment
to the next, there must be enough psychological and physical connectedness between person X
at t1 and person Y at t2 in order to say that X and Y are indeed one and the same person.
Aggregating over several moments, the connectedness between each of them will constitute the
continuity of a person over time, while at the same time admitting that between moment, say,
t2 and t9, there need not be any “qualitative identity”. All that matters for identity is that we
can connect a person’s changes over time and that change is not too radical from one moment to
the next. However, this account of continuity will only tell us who the person is, if we allow not
only for the possibility that the person changes (because of ageing, memory decay, experiences,
etc.), but that the person also chooses to change, that is, actively intervenes in the process of her
changes (Livet 2004). A person can to some degree choose who she wants to be, and at the same
time maintain a certain degree of connectedness between the di erent episodes of life in order to
guarantee her continuity over time. Personal identity, then, is not something given nor stable, but
the process – at least to some extent self-chosen – that explains change and connectedness of a
particular person over time.
This is what we aim to explore in our social interaction model, which we will base on a very
general account of individual behaviour. The underlying idea of the model is that agents have
particular (stochastic) preferences over the development of their personal states, which are cha-
racterised by individual characteristics, self-image and group (or type) participation. Individual
characteristics and group membership can be considered as describing the actual self of the indivi-
dual, whereas the self-image consists of a number of characteristics that the individual would like
to possess and could thus be considered as an ideal self of the individual. However, these di erent
selves are all part of the same person and can change over time. Indeed, the agent can for exam-
ple choose to belong to a particular group, which will help him attaining certain characteristics
that bring him closer to his self-image. The idea is that the agent knows that he will change by
participating in speciﬁc groups. For example, an agent can join a tennis club because he knows
that he will be able to take some tennis lessons and acquire those tennis skills that he has not
9had so far, but that he would have liked to have in his ideal image of himself.
The participation in groups will entail social interaction. What we assume is that several
people with their di erent individual characteristics and self-images will join one and the same
group – and this will contribute to the particular characteristics of the given social group. That
is, a group is also the “aggregate” of its participants, and when people with a variety of individual
characteristics join groups, they will, over time, contribute to a change in the “outlook” of those
groups. However, this change in characteristics of social groups will a ect the state of those
individuals who have chosen these groups. What can happen for example is that groups have
changed to such an extent that the original reason for joining that group is no longer valid for
a particular person.4 This may cause a discrepancy or uneasiness between the actual self of a
person and his ideal self and in order to restore consistency between his di erent aspects, the
person may want to change the group and chooses a di erent one that will help him better to
achieve his desired self-image-characteristics. For example, suppose that more and more people
join the above mentioned tennis club more in order to play tennis casually and to enjoy the
company of their co-club-members in the evenings than to play serious tennis. This may upset
the person who ﬁrst has chosen the club in order to become a good tennis player and this will
motivate him to look out for a di erent club where he will be able to ﬁnd more competitive tennis
partners.
In the next section, we thus present a global interaction model and more precisely a mean-
ﬁeld interaction model, where agents feel the impact of others through the empirical distribution
of group characteristics, which in its turn, drives the evolution of groups. Generally, agents are
endowed with a random utility function that depends on given groups, their current state and
their realisation in the next period, as well as on a noise term. The randomness here reﬂects all the
other factors not necessarily listed in the basic characteristics of an individual which may inﬂuence
this individual’s choices as well as identity. Thus, using probabilities reﬂects the idea that there
is some “noise” in the system which represents the heterogeneity of the agents and which is not
directly observable by the modeller. This is a typical assumption in social interaction models (e.g.
Brock and Durlauf 2000). Other interpretations of this persistent randomness involve assuming
ﬂuctuations in the way agents choose, some bounded rationality on the part of the agents or even
some process of learning that agents undergo through repeated choices (Blume 1995). Whatever
the interpretation, they all ﬁt with our model.
Choices will also entail some costs if the individual changes current individual characteristics
too far from a given self-image or from social groups for example. This captures the idea that
certain people may have a smaller or larger resistance to changes. It also avoids too radical changes
4This conﬂict has similarities to what was described by Fred Hirsch (1976), who observed that as more people
obtain “status” through the accumulation of what he called “positional goods”, the less status these goods o er.
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probability that depends on the agent’s current state given current groups. We then introduce an
interaction condition that depend on the inﬂuence of the current individual state and on current
groups. We use this to evaluate the connectedness of a person over time despite her changing
states and hence to determine her personal identity as discussed above. Indeed, if there is little
dependence on current individual state and current groups, then we will say that a person’s
connectedness between the di erent moments of her evolving life is low, that is, the personal
identity of this person is, in this sense, relatively weak. Her current individual state and current
groups have little inﬂuence on who the person will be tomorrow. In this sense, a person can make
any random choice; it will not matter much to her and her overall life-story. She makes decisions
essentially independently of her personal information, that is, her own decisions in the past and
has therefore no particular incentive to maintain a feeling of consistency or congruence. Indeed,
one could also say that at each moment, a new person or a new “self” emerges and all that we have
is a sequence of successive selves, which are relatively independent or unconnected one from the
other. The low dependency on current groups is similar to what Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001,
p.3) call a moderate social interaction (MSI) condition. In relation to that, we will call a low
dependency on the current individual state the moderate individual interaction (MII) condition.
On the other hand, if these dependencies are strong, then personal identity will be stronger, which
means that current individual state and current groups have a relatively stronger inﬂuence on who
the person will be tomorrow. A person’s identity is thus continuous over time, in the sense that the
di erent moments that constitute this person’s life are su ciently connected in order to attribute
them to one and the same person (or “self”) even though the person is changing.
The advantage of our approach is that it allows for some remarkable personal changes to take
place. One ﬁnds occasionally individuals who, for example, despite the highly constraining nature
of the social or economic environment in which they live, manage to develop a life which is not
at all consistent with their background. In our framework these may constitute low probability
events but which, nevertheless, can happen. To take an example, consider the case of Cornelia
Sorabji, a Parsee woman converted to Christianity, who was the ﬁrst woman to obtain a law
degree at Oxford and who went on to become a distinguished barrister and a militant human
rights advocate. Her career and life, including her conscientiously chosen changes, can be thought
of as a choice in our context. Indeed Amartaya Sen (2001, p. 331) says of her: “She chose her plural
identities inﬂuenced by her background, but through her own decisions and priorities. In the last
respect, she was not unique, despite the uniqueness of her chosen combination of identities.” This
sort of switch is possible in our model and it will have an important e ect on the evolution of the
individual’s identity but also on the evolution of the social groups that make up society.
Following the social interaction literature, what we are interested in is what happens at the
11“macroscopic” level, given the particular individual behaviour at the “microscopic” level. More
precisely, we want to deﬁne an appropriate notion of “equilibrium” for such a system. Then we
establish under what conditions this interactive stochastic system will be in such an equilibrium.
As it will turn out, when our MII and MSI conditions are satisﬁed, that is, when we place a
bound on intrapersonal and interpersonal interaction, then the evolution of groups settles down
asymptotically to a unique ﬁxed point and the sequence of individual states will converge to a
unique probability measure. It is this result which will allow us to say that when personal identity
is weak (MII and MSI conditions are satisﬁed), society “stabilises” and will not undergo any
further changes in the characteristics of the groups.
3 A Formal Model of Personal Identity with Social Interaction
Let us now be more speciﬁc about our formal model. We consider a model with an countably
inﬁnite set
A = {1,2,...}
of interacting economic agents. Each agent is characterized by her state. An agent’s state comprises
a list of her characteristics, her self-image (or desired self) and her social group. The characteristics
of the individual a   A are represented by a vector in ca in Rn. Its entries may represent not
only the standard preferences over goods but also many other dimensions such as the agents’
attitude towards smoking (non-smoker, occasional smoker, smoker) or outdoor activities (athletic,
unathletic), her athletic skills (professional tennis player, semi-professional tennis player, mediocre
tennis player, beginner) her level of income (high, low, medium), or the amount of time she devotes
to social activities for example. These are characteristics that can be changed over time. However,
there may also be other characteristics which remain “unchangeable” such as race or a person’s
height for example. For convenience, we think of the set C of possible characteristics as being
ﬁnite:
C = {c1,...,cm}.
We assume that self-images will also be represented by n-dimensional vectors. We do not
specify the origin of self-images. We simply assume that each person has at each moment of time
particular desires or aspirations the person wishes to attain with greater or smaller intensity.
These self-images do not necessarily contain only self-regarding characteristics. They may well
contain components that are inﬂuenced by the social background and culture in which a person
lives. The ﬁnite set of possible self images is denoted by
Z = {z1,...,zr}.
12At each point in time, the agent will have certain characteristics, a desired self-image and will
have chosen a social group. These groups can be for instance peer groups, sport clubs, or political
parties. A social group will be represented by a vector of the members’ “typical”, predominant
or average characteristics.5 These group-characteristics will be particularly appealing to certain
agents. That is, a high proﬁle tennis club, for example, may deﬁne itself in large part by a
member’s average income; on the other hand, a high-income dedicated tennis player is likely join
a club with a disproportional high number or proportion of wealthy committed sportsmen. In order
to capture the dependence of group characteristics on the average characteristics of the people
that joint them, groups are represented as elements of the convex hull of the set of characteristics.
More speciﬁcally we assume that the agents can choose from a ﬁnite set of groups and that the
vector of groups belongs to the compact convex set
X   Rn.
The agents’ characteristics and self-images are not ﬁxed but are modiﬁed over time either
as the result of the selection of social groups, but they can also be modiﬁed by direct choice.
For example, if a person decides to dress only in black, she can do so without needing to join
a particular social group. Self-images can also change after a process of personal reﬂection and
evaluation. Here, however, we do not specify in any further detail how and why self-images do
change, but simply assume that they can do so. Social groups, on the other hand, evolve as a
result of the choices of the individuals. The high proﬁle tennis club, for instance, may lose some
of its appeal to the more snobbish members over time, when it is joined by an increasing number
of average income people. For each time t   N we denote by
xt := (x1
t,...,xn
t )   X, ct = (ca
t) 
a=1 and zt = (za
t ) 
a=1
the vector of possible groups at time t, the current conﬁguration of characteristics and the current
conﬁguration of self-images, respectively. The empirical distribution associated to the conﬁgura-
tion (sa
t) 
a=1 is denoted by
 t := lim
n  
1
n
n  
a=1
 sa
t(·)
provided the limit exists. Here  s(·) denotes the Dirac measure that puts all mass on s   S.
Remark 3.1 Since the state space is ﬁnite the distribution  t can be identiﬁed with a vector  t =
( 
i,j,k
t ) where  i,j,k denotes the fraction of agents that choose group xi
t and whose characteristic
and self-image are given by cj and zk, respectively.
5Our framework would be ﬂexible enough to even introduce the members’ self-image-characteristics as charac-
teristics that deﬁne the social group. However, we do not explore this possibility at the moment.
13The empirical distribution  t describes the overall distribution of groups, characteristics and
self-images in the population at date t   N. The long run dynamics of aggregate behavior is thus
described by the asymptotics of the sequence { t}. What we shall eventually be interested in is
whether the groups settle down and also whether the proportions of individuals choosing those
groups stabilizes over time.
3.1 Utilities and Choices
As we said previously, at any point in time, an agent is speciﬁed by her characteristics, self-image
and social group. Social groups, however, change over time as a result of the choices of the indivi-
duals. For technical reasons this is inconvenient. While the number of possible groups is ﬁxed, the
actual characteristics of those groups at each point may not be the same. To overcome this pro-
blem we “label” groups and call them “types”. Individuals thus choose from or are characterized
by the“types” (i.e. labelled groups) they choose, even if what those types represent is changing.
For example, the Republican party is a “type” whose characteristics change but agents can still
choose to vote Republican. Hence, we will label the groups by 1,2,...,n, and we assume that the
agent a   A chooses a type ya
t from the set
Y := {1,2,...,n}.
In what follows, when we refer to xt, we mean the current conﬁguration in terms of charac-
teristics of “types” (groups), whereas yt refers more generally to “types”, that is labeled groups,
whose characteristics can change over time.
An agent is then characterized by his state sa
t,
sa
t = (ca
t,za
t ,ya
t ).
a vector of characteristics, self-image, and a type. The state space will be denoted by
S = {s = (c,z,y) : c   C, z   Z, y   Y }.
We assume that an agent’s new state in the following period t + 1 is given by the realization
of a random variable whose distribution depends on the current state. More speciﬁcally, given sa
t
and her new state sa
t+1 the agent enjoys the (random) utility
u(xt,sa
t,sa
t+1, a(sa
t+1)).
Here  a(sa
t+1) is a random variable whose realization my depend on the chosen state. If the
realization is observable to the agent prior to making her choice, her (conditional) optimal action
14is given by6
ˆ sa
t+1 = argmax
s u(xt,sa
t,s, a(s)).
Under mild restrictions on the utility function and the distribution of the random terms, the
optimal choice is almost surely uniquely deﬁned. In this case we denote the conditional distribution
of her best response by
 xt(sa
t;·).
The transition probability  x governs the one-step transition dynamics of individual characte-
ristics and self images given the current vector of types x. It reﬂects the preferences an agent has
over his future state, given the current characteristics of available types. Under the assumption
that the taste shocks are independent and identically distributed across individuals, the agents
act conditionally independently of each other, given their current states: while all the agents react
to the prevailing composition of social groups, the transition to a new state is made independently
of the current choice of others. As a result, the joint distribution of the new state (sa
t+1) 
a=1 in the
following period takes the product form
 xt(st;·) =
   
a=0
 xt(sa
t;·).
3.2 Examples of Utility Functions
Before we proceed with the dynamics of types, let us illustrate how our setting ﬁts into the discrete
choice framework associated with many models of social interaction. As it is customary in many
models of social interactions, we assume that the noise term enters the utility function in an
additive way so the utility function is of the form
U(xt,sa
t,sa
t+1) +  a(sa
t+1). (1)
We further assume that the random variables  (s) (s   S) are independent and doubly exponen-
tially distributed with parameter   > 0. That is,
P[ (s)   b] = e e b
.
Since  (s) has a continuous distribution and the set of states is ﬁnite an agent’s conditional optimal
choice is uniquely determined:
argmax
s S
 
U(xt,sa
t,sa
t+1) +  a(s)
 
.
6“If the realization is observable” means that once the observation is made, one has no longer to worry about
expected utility. However, if the agent does not know what his or her “taste shock” or random perturbation will be
tomorrow, it would be reasonable to maximise expected utility. If on the other hand the random term is observable,
we have a deterministic optimization problem. For an outsider (or modeller) though, it looks as if the agent is
making random choices when his or her shock is private information.
15It has been shown by Brock & Durlauf (2001, 2002) that assuming the double exponential
distribution implies that the probability of her choosing a speciﬁc state sa is given by
 xt(sa
t;sa) =
exp{ U(xt,sa
t,sa)}
 
ˆ s S exp{ U(xt,sa
t, ˆ sa)}
. (2)
Remark 3.2 For the special case   = 0 any state is chosen with equal probability. When  
tends to inﬁnity, an agent will choose with increasing probability her best response given her
current state. The quantity   may thus be viewed as parameterizing the sensitivity of choice. More
precisely, it parameterizes both the dependence of an agents’ choice on her present state and the
strength of interaction, i.e. the dependence of her choice of the choices of others (through the
types).
Let us illustrate the general setting by some speciﬁc examples. We begin with an example where
agents want to adopt for themselves, as much as possible, characteristics of some social group.
However, there is a cost of movement that penalizes deviations from the current characteristic
and some ﬁxed self-image. This is the characterisation of a rather “conservative” behaviour, where
agents do not want to change too much and prefer, other things being equal, to remain who they
are.
Example 3.3 Suppose that the agents’ self image is a given ﬁxed vector z  so the choice varia-
bles are characteristics and social groups. Assume furthermore that the utility function given the
current vector of types xt and the current characteristic ca
t takes the form
U(xt,ca
t,sa) = u
 
x
ya
t ,ca
 
  J1|ca
t   ca|   J2|z    ca|   J3|x
ya
t
t   ca| +  (sa). (3)
Here u(x
ya
t ,ca) is an instantaneous utility associated with the current choice that is independent of
the prevailing characteristic. The quantities J1 and J2 penalize deviations from current characte-
ristics and the self image, while J3 measures the dependence of an agent’s utility of the di erence
between the chosen characteristic and the characteristics of the selected social group. The random
shocks are independent and doubly exponentially distributed with   = 1 so the conditional joint
distribution of labels and characteristics in the following period is then given by
 xt(sa
t;sa) =
exp
 
u(ca,x
ya
t )   J1|ca
t   ca|   J2|z    ca|   J3|x
ya
t
t   ca|
 
 
ˆ sa S exp
 
u(ˆ ca,x
ˆ ya
t )   J1|ca
t   ˆ ca|   J2|z    ˆ ca|   J3|x
ˆ ya
t   ˆ ca|
 . (4)
The next example captures a situation where an agent’s cost of moving own characteristics
closer to her desired self-image can be reduced by choosing an appropriate social group.
16Example 3.4 Suppose again that the self-image is ﬁxed at some level z  and consider the follo-
wing modiﬁcation of the utility function in (3):
U(xt,sa
t,sa) = u
 
x
ya
t ,ca
 
  J1|ca
t +  (x
ya
t   ca
t)   c|   J2|z    ca| +  (sa). (5)
As in the preceding example the parameter J2 penalizes deviations of characteristics from the
desired self-image. What distinguishes the current utility function from that in (3) is the fact
that by choosing a social group an agent’s old characteristics moves some distance   towards that
group. This may reduce the cost of choosing a new characteristic in the vicinity of the agent’s
self-image z . In this case the transition probabilities are independent of the self-image and take
the form
 xt(sa
t;sa) =
exp
 
u(x
ya
t ,ca)   J1|ca
t +  (x
ya
t   ca
t)   c|   J2|z    ca|
 
 
ˆ sa S exp
 
u(ˆ ca,x
ˆ ya
t )   J1|ca
t +  (x
ˆ ya
t   ca
t)   ˆ ca|   J2|z    ˆ ca|
 . (6)
The general form of the utility function (1) includes situations where the agents’ only choice
variables can be types and where new characteristics and self-images could be implicitly deﬁned
in terms of the group choice. This is captured by a functional relation between the current charac-
teristics (self-images) and chosen type and the new characteristics (self-images). More generally,
we may allow for some randomness in this functional relation and consider a situation of the form
ca
t+1 = f
 
ca
t,x
ya
t
t , a
t
 
and za
t+1 = g
 
za
t ,x
ya
t
t , a
t
 
.
Here the realizations of the random variables  a
t and  a
t are observable prior to making the decision.
As an illustration we may think of a situation in which the characteristics and self-images move
a random distance towards the group that they choose.
Example 3.5 Consider the following modiﬁcation of the utility function in (3) where there is no
intrinsic value to an agents’ choice:
U(xt,sa
t,sa) =  J
   
 f
 
ca,x
ya
t
t , a
t
 
  g
 
za
t ,x
ya
t
t , a
t
    
  +  (ya). (7)
Here the agent uses the group characteristics to move her own characteristics closer to her desired
self-image. The distance between her characteristics and self-image is penalized by a multiplier J
and there is a random cost  (ya) associated with the choice of the label ya. In this case the transition
dynamics of the states take a more complex form even if we assume that the random variables  a
and  a are independent and identically distributed across time and agents.
173.3 Dynamics of Types
What we want to look at is the evolution of the types over time and how this is inﬂuenced by
the movement of individuals between the types. For this we have to make assumptions about
the way in which the characteristics of types are modiﬁed by the changes in the choices of the
individuals. To obtain a ﬁrst simple characterization of the dynamics of the sequence {xt}t N, we
assume that types are modiﬁed as a function of average behavior. In the ﬁrst place we restrict
ourselves to a simple linear updating rule for the dynamics of types. This leads us to make the
following assumption.
Assumption 3.6 There exist a Lipschitz continuous function F = (f1,...,fm) with constant L
and a constant     (0,1) such that
xi
t+1 =  xi
t + (1    )fi( t+1) so that xt+1 =  xt + (1    )F( t+1). (8)
We illustrate Assumption 3.6 by the following example where types are simply points on the
unit interval and the way in which they change is determined by the fractions of individuals
choosing them.
Example 3.7 (i) Suppose that xi
t   [0,1] and that new types are convex combinations of the
old type and the proportion of individuals choosing them. In this case
fi( t+1) =
 
1i(y) t+1(dc,dy) = lim
n  
1
n
n  
a=1
1i(ya
t+1)
We may view  t+1 as a vector ( 
i,j,k
t+1 ), so
fi( t+1) =
 
j,k
 
i,j,k
t+1 .
As a result, the mapping F is Lipschitz continuous with constant 1.
(ii) The new types could also reﬂect the characteristics of those who selected them. In such a
situation new types could be given as a convex combination of old types and the average
characteristics of the members:
fi( t+1) =
 
c1i(y) t+1(dc,dy)  
1i(y) t+1(dc,dy)
.
We have the following representation:
fi( t+1) =
 
j,k cj 
i,j,k
t+1
 
j,k  
i,j,k
t+1
. (9)
18In this case Assumption 3.6 requires that an agent chooses each state with strictly positive
probability. If each state is chosen with probability at least  , then F is Lipschitz with constant
L( ). The Lipschitz constant is decreasing in  .
Given the evolution of types {xt} the evolution of the aggregate behavior as described by the
process { t} can almost surely be described by a deterministic recursive relation, due to the law
of large numbers of independent random variables. In fact, all the agents that ﬁnd themselves in
the same state choose their new states - independently of others - with the same probabilities.
Thus, there is a proportion  xt(sa
t;sa
t+1) of agents with current state sa
t that choose to be in state
sa
t+1 in the next period. Since the fraction of agents in state sa
t is  t(sa
t) the distribution of states
at
 t+1 =
 
 xt(sa;·) t(dsa) := H( t,xt) (10)
The joint dynamics of types and empirical distributions thus follows (almost surely) the determi-
nistic recursive relation
 
 t+1
xt+1
 
=
 
H(xt, t)
 xt + (1    )F   H(xt, t)
 
=: G(xt, t). (11)
3.4 Equilibrium States and the Long Run Dynamics of Aggregate Behaviour
So far we have introduced the concepts of individual and social change in the immediate future,
i.e from one time-period to the next. To analyze what happens in the longer run, we need an
interaction condition that puts restrictions on the agent’s individual behaviour. More speciﬁcally,
in order to guarantee an almost sure convergence of types and average actions, we need to impose
a weak interaction condition on the agents’ individual behavior. We express the weak interaction
condition in terms of the following total variation norm:
1
2
| x(s;·)    x(ˆ s;·)|1 =
1
2
 
˜ s
| x(s; ˜ s)    x(ˆ s; ˜ s)|.
Assumption 3.8 (i) The individual transition probabilities depend continuously on both the
social types and the current states. More precisely, there exist constants  1 and  2 such that
uniformly in types and states we have that
1
2
| x(s;·)    x(ˆ s;·)|1    1 and
1
2
| x(s;·)    ˆ x(s;·)|1    2
n  
i=1
|xi   ˆ xi|.
(ii) The constants  1 and  2 satisfy  1 +  1 < 1.
19The coe cient  1 measures the dependence of an agents’ new type and characteristics on his
current state. If  1 is low, it represents a moderate individual interaction (MII) condition. In the
special case where where agents choose their new states independently of their previous states,
 x(s;·) =  x(ˆ s;·),
and we can choose  1 = 0. In a personal identity sense, this would mean that there is no connec-
tedness between the di erent choices of the agent. The agent is nothing other than a succession
of di erent selves. That is, agents choose randomly their new state, independently of their own
personal history. If, on the other hand, the agents “remain who they are” in the sense that
 x(s;s) = 1 and  x(ˆ s; ˆ s) = 0 for some ˆ z  = z
we have that  1 = 1 and Assumption 3.8 (ii) is violated. This means that agents have a very
strong personal connectedness and that they stick to their previous decision and remain who they
are7. However, even in the case where people choose to remain the same, this does not mean that
agents do not, in fact, change. Indeed, the type to which they belong may well have been changed,
but this has not motivated the agent to move on and to select a di erent type.
Example 3.9 Consider again the utility function in (3). In this case  1 is an increasing function
of J1 and  1 = 0 means that J1 = 0. For the utility function of Example 3.4  1 increases in both
J1 and  .
The constant  2 places a quantitative bound on the dependence of the new state on the
current vector of types. If  2 is low, it represents the marginal social interaction (MSI) condition.
A low  2 implies that the probability of choosing a new state depends little on current types. In
other words, it means that the agents’ preferences for future states do not change much if the
characteristics of available types change a little. A high  2 on the other hand implies that agents
can react very strongly to changes in characteristics in available types8.
7Note that  1 is a bound placed on the di erence between two di erent transition probabilities  x. This means
that in the case  1 has a low value, the two transition probabilities  x cannot be too di erent. In the case where
 1 has a higher value, the two transition probabilities may, but do not need to be, di erent,. Thus, in the latter
case, there is a higher chance that an agent will end up in a particular state, given that he was in a speciﬁc state
previously. That is, the agent may put “more weight” on his previous state.
8As in the case of  1,  2 places a bound on the di erence between the two transition probabilities  x and  ˆ x
if the distance between the two vectors of groups x and ˆ x is not too large. If the latter distance would be large,
then even a very small  2 would not impose any restrictions on the transition probabilities and we cannot say
much about this situation. However, again, whereas a small  2 implies that the two transition probabilities must
be almost similar, a higher value of  2 tells us that the two transition probabilities can be di erent (but do not
need to be). Thus, in the latter case, there is a higher chance that agents will end in a particular state, given the
previous characteristics of available groups. It is also clear that, if the distance between the two vectors of groups
is very small, but  2 rather high, the di erence between the two transition probabilities must also be small.
20Example 3.10 Consider again the utility function in (3). In this case  2 is an increasing function
of J3 and  2 = 0 means that J3 = 0. For the utility function of Example 3.4  3 increases in both
J1 and   and  3 = 0 if and only if   = 0.
In terms of personal identity then, this means that if  1 and  2 are small, personal connected-
ness between two di erent moments is relatively low. Hence, personal identity is weak - a person’s
new state will depend little on her current state and on types. We have here again the typical
multiple self conception where a person is nothing else than a succession of di erent selves.
3.4.1 Existence of Aggregate Equilibrium
In a model where agents’ choices have a random component, the resultant ¨ experimentsprevent
agents’ choices from converging pathwise to some steady state. An appropriate notion of equili-
brium is not a particular state but rather a distribution of states that reﬂect the proportion of
time the process spends in the various states. This notion of equilibrium is closely related to the
notion of equilibrium on the aggregate level of the empirical distribution. In our model the agents
choose their states conditionally independently of each other so the dynamics of social groups
and empirical distributions follows a recursive deterministic dynamics. A ﬁxed point (x ,  ) of
the mapping (11) may be viewed as an aggregate equilibrium. If the groups are initially located
according to the vector x  and the distribution of states is given by   , then the system is in a
steady state at the aggregate level. While the individual states ﬂuctuate in a random manner,
the social types do not move and the distribution of states is ﬁxed. The existence of an aggregate
equilibrium follows from Assumption 3.8 (i). It is easy to show that the continuity condition on
the individual transition laws along with the continuity of F implies continuity of the map G.
Since G maps a compact convex set into itself, it has a ﬁxed point, due to Brower’s theorem. We
thus have show the following result.
Theorem 3.11 Suppose that Assumption 3.6 and Assumption 3.8 (i) are satisﬁed. Then the map
G has a ﬁxed point so an aggregate equilibrium exists.
3.4.2 Uniqueness of Aggregate Equilibrium
While the existence of an aggregate equilibrium follows immediately from mild continuity condi-
tions on the agents’ choice probabilities, a uniqueness and stability result requires much stronger
assumptions. It has been established in the social interaction literature (Brock & Durlauf (2001,
2002), Horst & Scheinkman (2006, 2007)) that uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed if the
interaction is su ciently weak. Our Assumption 3.8 (ii) can be viewed as such a weak interaction
condition. It requires both  1 and  2 to be small, that is that MII and MSI are satisﬁed. Thus,
21loosely speaking Assumption 3.8 says that agents do not put “too much weight” on current states
when revising their choices, and that preferences depend continuously on types.
Our weak interaction condition of the agent’s individual behavior also constrains the macros-
copic behavior of agents. The future distribution of agents over types is continuously dependent
on the current distribution of agents and the current vector of types. That is, the weak inter-
action condition constrains the dependence of the future distribution of agents on the current
distribution and the characteristics of the available types.
We are now ready to state our convergence result. Its proof is given in the appendix.
Theorem 3.12 Suppose that Assumption 3.8 is satisﬁed and that L  < 1.
a) The sequence {(xt, t)}t N of types and empirical actions converges almost surely to the
unique ﬁxed point (x ,  ) of the map G.
b) The stochastic kernel  x  has a unique stationary measure µ and the sequence of individual
states converges in probability, i.e., for all states s,
lim
t  
P[sa
t = s] = µ(s)
The ﬁrst part of the theorem gives a su cient (though not necessary) condition that guarantees
that the types settle down to a unique limit x  in the long run. Asymptotically, the agents new
characteristics is thus chosen according to the transition probability
 x (sa
t;·),
and in the long run, the full dynamics of the microscopic process {st}t N is described by the
stochastic kernel
 x (st : ·) =
   
a=1
 x (sa
t;·).
Under our assumptions, the transition law  x  has a unique stationary distribution µ and, for
any initial condition s0, the distribution of individual states converges weakly to µ. In this sense
the dynamics on the macroscopic level of types and average actions settle down to a unique
deterministic limit (x ,  ) whereas the dynamics on the microscopic level of individual behavior
settles down to the probabilistic limit µ. In equilibrium therefore, the characteristics of types’ will
not change anymore but each type will continue to be constantly chosen by a given fractions of
agents. Agents themselves will continuously move from one group to the other according to given
probabilities. Depending on the higher or lower entry-values of the probabilistic limit µ, agents
will move more slowly or hop rather quickly from one type to the other. At each time, however, the
individuals’ probabilities of being in one of the future states do not depend much on their current
22state and on the characteristics of available types. Hence, the agent’s switching of types does not
have any impact on his individual history because his di erent choices are disconnected from each
other. During each step, the agent assimilates to a greater or lesser degree the characteristics of
the respective group. Hence, in equilibrium, agents are multiple selves that randomly adapt to
di erent social groups. Their personal identity though, i.e. their connected and related change
over time, has lost much of its signiﬁcance.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
We have presented a dynamic model of social interaction that is based on an account of individual
behaviour which is enriched by taking into account the idea that people are concerned about the
evolution of their personal identity. In particular we allow people to inﬂuence that evolution. They
choose to participate in particular groups, not solely in order to conform to a certain set of rules
or actions of their social environment, but because they know that the participation at those
groups will have an e ect on their individual characteristics. People do not belong to ﬁxed groups
but rather use the latter as a means to an end. They can learn particular abilities or acquire
characteristics that they would like to possess according their desired self-image, that is, “who”
they would like to be at some point in the future. Social interaction comes through the selection
of social groups. However, what is important in our model is that the choices made by individuals
as to which group to join in turn determine the evolution of those groups. This is because the
groups’ characteristics will be modiﬁed by the people joining them. This in its turn will induce
individuals to revise their evaluations of groups and possibly to choose an alternative to their
present choice.
Our aim has been to deﬁne a notion of what might be thought of as an equilibrium of this
dynamic process. Then we established the conditions under which the interactive dynamics of
individual behaviour and social groups converge to a unique and stable equilibrium. As has been
found in other social interaction models, we show that convergence to such an equilibrium is gua-
ranteed if interaction is su ciently weak. In our dynamic framework, this requires the satisfaction
of two conditions – the marginal social interaction (MSI) condition and the marginal individual
interaction (MII) condition. This means that if the agents’ choices of their new states are su -
ciently independent of current groups and current individual states, a unique stable equilibrium
exists. Translated back into a personal identity context, this means that people’s choices are re-
latively unconnected from one moment to the next, that is, they are su ciently independent of
people’s personal history and social backgrounds. Paradoxically, perhaps, this can be thought of
as saying that the personal identity of individuals is relatively weak. An equilibrium under these
circumstances means that on the macroscopic level, there will have emerged a ﬁxed number of
23social groups whose evolution of characteristics has been stabilised. On the microscopic level, in-
dividuals will continue to move between groups. However, the distribution of individuals between
groups will not change in the long run.
Our results then, in a sense, contrast with models of segregation in which agents, endowed
with explicit preferences for particular states, can choose where to situate themselves on a given
network or interaction structure (e.g. B´ enabou 1993, Akerlof 1997). If agents in our model had
strong preferences for particular states, that is, if, the MII or MSI condition would be violated,
then we may not have convergence to a unique equilibrium independently of initial conditions, but
we may have a number of di erent possible equilibria. Consequently, any segregated or stabilised
society may not be the result of the particular preferences of individuals (e.g. for their education,
the place where they live or even the racial composition of their neighbourhood, such as in
Schelling (1971)), but could also be because choices are made on a random basis without any
speciﬁc rationale. However, even in our framework, we may still obtain convergence with very
particular preferences. If all agents would choose their current state with probability one, then
nothing ever changes and the system would obviously be in equilibrium but one in which there
is no social mobility. Hence, the observation of any particular formation or segregation of groups
does not necessarily reveal much about the underlying behaviour of individuals. In our particular
case, it may be that if individuals did care more about the evolution of their personal identity, they
would be able to live in a more dynamic society where they and groups continue to change and
where they would supposedly have a larger set of possibilities to achieve any desired self-images
and the kind of life they would like to live.
This consideration is clearly related to the freedom of choice and opportunity literature (e.g.
Gravel 1994, Sen 1985, Pattanaik and Xu 1998, Sugden 1998 etc.) and the question would then
be to what extent a person can achieve what he desires. Indeed, an interesting extension of the
proposed model would be to see under which conﬁguration of society, individuals would achieve
their highest welfare and/or had their greatest freedom of choice to become “who” they want to
be. This would also be well in line with what in Ball (2003) refers to as “counterfactual history”
(p. 201). In Ball’s introductory paper into “The Physical Modelling of Human Social Systems”
(2003), a framework that is close to that of our own model, he states that this kind of approach
is helpful in order to lay out a range of di erent “counterfactual” scenarios, to stimulate the
reﬂection on particular issues concerning the interaction between personal desires and preferences
and membership of particular social groups. Indeed, one of the aims in this paper has also been
to show that social interaction does not always consist in conformity or in aligning behaviour
to particular reference groups as previous social interaction papers have often assumed, but that
individuals can also be seen as “autonomous” and “independent” beings, despite being members
of a particular social structure in which they participate and with which they interact.
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28A Proof of Theorem 3.12
Our weak interaction condition guarantees that the maps      H(x, ) and x   H(x, ) are
contractions with respect to | · |1 with constants  1 and  2 uniformly in x   X and     U,
respectively9. More precisely, under Assumption 3.8,
|H(x, )   H(x, ˆ  )|1    1|    ˆ  |1 and |H(x, )   H(ˆ x, )|1    2|x   ˆ x|1.
This means that the future distribution of agents over types is continuously dependent on the
current distribution of agents and the current vector of types. That is, the weak interaction
condition restraints the dependence of the future distribution of agents on the current distribution
and the characteristics of available types. Stated di erently, if we had two almost similar but
still di erent current distributions of agents and characteristics of available types, the future
distribution of agents in both “worlds” would be almost the same.
Proof of Theorem 3.12:
a) In order to guarantee a convergence of the empirical distributions, we need to impose a
growth condition on F. To this end, we equip X   U with the norm
|(x, )t| := max{|x|1,| |1}.
and denote by |DF( )|1 the column-sum-norm of the derivative DF( ) of the function F
introduced in (8). With L := sup  |DF( )|1, the map      F( ) is Lipschitz continuous with
constant L:
|F( )   F(ˆ  )|1   L|    ˆ  |1.
In particular, the maps x     x + (1    )F   H(x, ) and       x + (1    )F   H(x, ) are
Lipschitz with constant   + (1    )L 2 and (1    )L 1, respectively. As a result, the map
(x, )     x + (1    )F   H(x, )
and the map G deﬁned in (11) are Lipschitz continuous with respective constants
  + (1    )L  and max{  + (1    )L , }.
In particular, G is a contraction if  L < 1. Since G maps the compact convex set X   U
continuously into itself, and so the assertion follows from standard ﬁxed-point arguments.
9For details we refer the reader to Horst (2000).
29b) Under Assumption 10, the stochastic kernel  x  has a unique stationary measures µ. Since
the sequence {xn}n N converges almost surely to x , we can apply similar arguments as in
Horst (2000) to prove convergence is distribution of individual states.
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